Intermediate Microeconomics · 免费预览
一级歧视与二级歧视
完全歧视获取全部剩余，按照支付意愿对每个单位定价，既有效率但具有榨取性；而二级歧视在不知道消费者类型的情况下定价，通过数量折扣、版本和两部收费制将消费者筛选为自我选择，在例题中，同质消费者支付1936的费用和12的单位价格。
1. First degree
First degree
2. Second degree
Second degree
3. Two-part tariffs
Two-part tariffs
4. Bundling and the family's end
Bundling and the family's end
5. The first-degree outcome
What does a perfectly discriminating monopolist produce and who keeps the surplus?
6. Second degree's problem
What defines the second-degree discrimination setting?
7. The worked tariff
Identical consumers, P equal 100 minus 2Q, MC 12. What two-part tariff extracts all surplus?
8. Bundling's condition
When does bundling raise revenue over separate sales?
9. The fee's ceiling
Compute consumer surplus at p 12 and Q 44, half of 88 times 44, and write the number.
10. Quantity at cost pricing
Solve 100 minus 2Q equal 12 for Q, and write the number.
11. The two-part profit
With entry fee 1936 and per-unit price 12 equal to MC, what does the two-part monopolist earn per customer?
12. A mis-set fee
Suppose the firm charges per-unit 12 but sets the entry fee at only 1000. What happens?
13. Bundling's arithmetic
User A values a word processor at 90 and a spreadsheet at 10, user B the reverse. What does a 99-dollar bundle of both earn?
14. When bundling fails
Now both users value both products at 60. How do separate sales at 60 compare with any bundle?
15. Profit per customer
Under the optimal two-part tariff with fee 1936 and usage price 12, compute profit per customer, and write the number.
16. Bundle revenue
Two users each value a bundle at 100 and the bundle prices at 99. Compute total revenue, and write the number.