Intermediate Microeconomics · 免费预览
公共物品与搭便车
公共物品具有非竞争性和非排他性，有效供给需将支付意愿纵向相加；案例中的公园，收益为 40 减 q 和 25 减 q，成本为 60，在 q 为 2.5 时提供；自愿供给则供给不足，因为每个人都在等待其他人；而 VCG 机制和维克里拍卖则以付费的方式把如实申报重新买回来。
1. The vertical sum
The vertical sum
2. Free riding
Free riding
3. Buying truthfulness
Buying truthfulness
4. The provision decision
The provision decision
5. The Samuelson condition
What does the Samuelson condition for public goods require?
6. The worked provision level
Compute the efficient trail length from 65 minus 2q equals 60.
7. Free riding
Why does voluntary provision under-supply the public good?
8. Vickrey's design
Why is truthful bidding dominant in a second-price auction?
9. The summed first-unit benefit
Compute the total marginal benefit of the first unit, 40 plus 25, and write the number.
10. The stopping margin
At q of 2.5, compute resident 1's marginal benefit, 40 minus 2.5, and write the number.
11. The second resident's valuation
At the efficient trail length q of 2.5, what is resident 2's marginal benefit?
12. The first unit's case
At q of 1, total marginal benefit is 40 plus 25 minus 2. What does the condition say?
13. The free rider's arithmetic
If each resident naively contributes only what the trail is worth to them privately, what happens?
14. The auction's payment
In the second-price logic, you value the trail at 40 and the other bid comes in at 25. What do you pay and gain?
15. Resident two at the optimum
At q of 2.5, compute resident 2's marginal benefit as 25 minus 2.5, and write the number.
16. The first unit's total benefit
At q of 1, compute the total marginal benefit as 65 minus 2, and write the number.