Intermediate Microeconomics · 免费预览
信息不对称
质量信息隐藏导致逆向选择：以 7 的平均定价会把对其车主价值为 8 的好车挤出市场，柠檬市场随之瓦解；当教育成本不同时，信号传递可以区分类型；筛选则提供自我选择的菜单；道德风险隐藏行为，这体现了保险与激励之间的委托代理权衡。
1. The lemons
The lemons
2. Signaling
Signaling
3. Screening and menus
Screening and menus
4. Moral hazard
Moral hazard
5. The unraveling price
Why will buyers pay only 7 in a half-good half-lemon market?
6. The exit of quality
What happens to good cars when the market price is 7?
7. The signaling band
With able cost 2 and unable cost 4 per unit and premium 10, which education levels separate?
8. Moral hazard's tradeoff
What tradeoff does the principal-agent contract balance?
9. The unable type's cost
Compute the unable type's cost of 3 units of education at 4 per unit, and write the number.
10. The able type's net gain
At 3 units, compute the able type's net gain, premium 10 minus cost 6, and write the number.
11. The average's anatomy
Half the cars are good worth 10 to owners, half lemons worth 4. Why is 7 the buyers' ceiling?
12. A signal too weak
With able cost 2 and unable cost 4 per unit and premium 10, why does 2 units of education fail to separate?
13. Hidden type versus hidden act
What distinguishes adverse selection from moral hazard?
14. The deductible's logic
Why does a deductible reduce careless behavior in insurance?
15. The average car's value
With good cars worth 10 and lemons worth 4 in equal shares, compute the average value, and write the number.
16. The able type's education cost
With able cost 2 per unit, compute the able type's cost of 3 units of education, and write the number.