Microeconomics · 免费预览
承诺与可信性
战略行动改变的是博弈本身，而它只有在以显而易见的方式消除行动者自身的可选策略时才奏效，从而把昨天的空洞威胁变成今天确凿的算术。
1. Changing the game
Changing the game
2. Devices that bind
Devices that bind
3. Threats and promises
Threats and promises
4. Credibility in the wild
Credibility in the wild
5. What makes a threat credible
When is a threat to punish a rival's action credible in a sequential game?
6. Schelling's paradox
Why can burning your own bridges increase your payoff?
7. The contract's price
An incumbent can sign a supply contract paying 15 million in penalties if its output ever falls below the war level. Without it, fighting after entry costs the incumbent 10 million in lost profit relative to accommodating. Compute the net payoff change from accommodating instead of fighting once the contract is signed, and write the number in millions.
8. Credibility's test
When is a threat to punish a rival's action credible in a sequential game?
9. Bridges, burned
Why can burning your own bridges increase your payoff in a strategic setting?
10. The contract's bite
An incumbent signs a supply contract paying 15 million in penalties if its output ever falls below a threshold, raising its fighting payoff by that amount. If fighting previously fell short of accommodating by 11 million, compute the post-contract surplus from fighting, and write the number.