Microeconomics · 免费预览
威慑与进入
在位企业凭借产能、声誉以及价格本身进行威慑，但每一种手段都必须经得起可信性检验，而反垄断这条红线正是用来约束那些通不过该检验的掠夺性方案。
1. Buying a bigger tree
Buying a bigger tree
2. Pricing to deter
Pricing to deter
3. Predation's question
Predation's question
4. The strategist's summary
The strategist's summary
5. Capacity as commitment
Why does an incumbent's prebuilt idle capacity deter entry more credibly than a verbal threat to flood the market?
6. The predation test
Why do antitrust courts require evidence of below-cost pricing and a plausible recoupment path before finding predation?
7. Deterrence's price
An incumbent earns 80 a year as an undisturbed monopolist. Idle capacity costs 20 a year to maintain and deters entry completely, preserving the 80. Without the capacity, entry occurs and profits fall to 30 a year. Compute the annual payoff from maintaining deterrence, and write the number.
8. Capacity that talks
Why does an incumbent's prebuilt idle capacity deter entry more credibly than a verbal threat?
9. The recoupment requirement
Why do antitrust courts require evidence of below-cost pricing and a plausible recoupment path before condemning predatory pricing?
10. Deterrence's arithmetic
An incumbent earns 80 a year as an undisturbed monopolist, and idle deterrent capacity costs 20 a year. If entry would cut its yearly earnings to 30, compute the annual profit if deterrence succeeds, and write the number.