Microeconomics · 免费预览
博弈中的人类
现实中的博弈参与者会拒绝不公平的分配，回报善意，并付出自身代价惩罚作弊者；行为博弈论将这些系统性的社会偏好重新纳入预测之中。
1. The ultimatum surprise
The ultimatum surprise
2. The taste for punishment
The taste for punishment
3. Cheap talk and its discontents
Cheap talk and its discontents
4. The games module closes
The games module closes
5. Reading the ultimatum result
In ultimatum game experiments, offers below 20 percent of the pie are rejected about half the time, and average offers run 30 to 50 percent. What is the standard economic interpretation?
6. Cheap talk's informativeness
When does a costless announcement credibly convey information?
7. Punishment's price
In a punishment experiment, a responder rejects an 8 dollar share of a 40 dollar pie, giving up 8 dollars to deny the proposer 32. Compute the proposer's loss from the rejection, and write the number.
8. The ultimatum surprise
In ultimatum experiments offers below 20 percent of the pie are rejected about half the time. What does this reveal that the basic model missed?
9. When cheap talk carries weight
When does a costless announcement credibly convey information?
10. The rejected share's cost
In a punishment experiment a responder rejects an 8 dollar share of a 40 dollar pie. Compute the amount the proposer loses from the rejection, and write the number.